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This research project examines Army contract administration procedures in the 
Continental United States (CONUS) and Outside Continental United States (OCONUS) 
performed by Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs) for service contracts. We 
analyze COR roles, responsibilities, education/training, communication, staff levels, 
oversight, and leadership support by comparing and contrasting Army COR contract 
administration processes from a CONUS and OCONUS perspective. The results inform 
Army Contracting leadership about differences and discrepancies that exist in the training 
of CORs and in the processes followed. 
Using regulatory documents, audit reports, and interviews with CONUS and 
OCONUS CORs and supervisors, leaders, and commanders of CORs, we found gaps and 
challenges that affect the completion of COR duties relating to Army service contracts. 
We identified five common COR issues that need to be addressed: education/training, 
communication, staff levels, oversight, and leadership support. We found that COR 
training differs in CONUS and OCONUS environments. Additionally, lessons learned 
revealed that COR training remains inadequate, communication among contracting 
personnel and CORs requires improvement, staff levels need to be increased to support 
contract administration, managers nominate CORs who lack technical knowledge and 
experience, and commanders and leaders neither understand the requirements needed to 
support contract administration requirements nor COR roles and responsibilities.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Inadequate surveillance of contracts has left [the Department] vulnerable 
to the potential that we are paying full price for less than full value. 
 —Ashton B. Carter (Acquisition Reform, 2011) 
 
During the last decade, the Department of Defense (DOD) has increasingly used 
and relied on contractors to support operations in both the Continental United States 
(CONUS) and Outside Continental United States (OCONUS) environments due to the 
shortages of personnel in certain civilian and military occupational specialties 
(Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2008). Not only has the number of contracts 
increased, but also the requirements on those contracts have become increasingly 
complex. The DOD allows contractors to perform tasks that service members used to 
perform, so the monitoring of operational contract performance has become more 
necessary and more difficult. This increased use of contracted support requires more 
government personnel to perform contract administration and oversight responsibilities. 
Until recently, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) had performed the 
majority of contract administration and surveillance for large-dollar complex CONUS 
service contracts as well as Contingency Contract Administration Services (CCAS) for 
OCONUS service contracts. In April 2014, DCMA relinquished CCAS support, leaving 
each of the military services to provide oversight and administration of their own 
OCONUS contracts (Department of Defense, Defense Contract Management Agency 
[DOD DCMA], 2014). The change in contract administration support for OCONUS 
service contracts left a large performance-monitoring gap for the military services 
(heretofore called “services”) to fill in a short time. The services received a six-month 
notice of the impending CCAS change when notified in October 2013. The services were 
not trained—and thus were unprepared—to handle the responsibility of performing 
CCAS tasks. Specific CCAS training was necessary in order to perform unique tasks 
associated with the CCAS mission (Adrian, 2014). “CCAS tasks involve non-
commercial, complex, cost-type contracts,” which is different from typical contingency 
type contracts (Adrian, 2014, p. 3). In November 2014, the Army Contracting Command, 
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in conjunction with DCMA-Kuwait representatives, provided Army Contingency 
Contracting personnel with a two-week CCAS training session (Adrian, 2014). 
Contract administration requires continuous monitoring of contractor 
performance, which includes analysis and verification of services rendered. As the “on 
the ground” administrators of the contract, Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs) 
(1) verify goods and services meet the contract requirements, (2) monitor and collaborate 
the technical aspects of contractor performance with key stakeholders, (3) provide 
contract oversight and physical surveillance; and (4) perform administrative duties such 
as monitoring and approving invoices for payment (Defense Acquisition University 
[DAU], 2016).  
Contracting Officers designate CORs in writing based on the Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) guidelines to perform contract surveillance 
from an administrative and technical perspective (DAU, 2016). CORs play a vital role in 
surveying, communicating, and documenting overall status of the contract to the 
contractor and the Contracting Officer. 
A. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
Current acquisition news bulletins and numerous Department of Defense 
Inspector General (DOD IG) and GAO reports identify continuing issues in Army 
Contract Administration processes. The problems exist in both CONUS and OCONUS 
contingency environments. In May 2012, DOD IG personnel performed an audit and 
prepared a report that identified that U.S. Army Corps of Engineers officials “did not 
provide adequate oversight [on] the construction of a detention facility [in Afghanistan, 
nor] did they comply with internal [control] policies regarding oversight of the 
contractor’s warranty” (Department of Defense Inspector General [DOD IG], 2012, p. 4). 
In December 2015, DOD IG personnel performed an audit and prepared a report on 
Hurricane Sandy CONUS service contracts that identified that U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers CORs did not effectively oversee and monitor contractor performance (DOD 
IG, 2015a).  
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Furthermore, a March 2015 Contingency Contracting Framework Update report 
noted that DOD IG personnel had issued 40 reports from 2012 to 2014 that identified 
systemic contracting problems in OCONUS environments. Twenty-seven out of the 40, 
or 68% of these reports, identified inadequate contract oversight and surveillance as 
major problem areas because CORs did not develop adequate oversight strategies and 
Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans (QASPs) (DOD IG, 2015b, p. 6). The DOD IG 
report (2015b) pointed out that insufficient staffing and training/certification prevented 
COR personnel from effectively performing contract surveillance (p. 12). These contract 
administration deficiencies are a recurring theme in both CONUS and OCONUS 
environments. This research aims to find solutions to these problems and improve Army 
contract administration processes in both CONUS and OCONUS by answering the 
following primary and secondary research questions: 
1. Primary Research Question 
 Are COR processes and training different or the same in CONUS 
and OCONUS environments? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
 What are the lessons learned/best practices in overseeing Army 
CONUS and OCONUS service contracts? 
 What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of CORs 
performing administration on Army contracts in CONUS and 
OCONUS? 
B. PURPOSE AND BENEFIT 
This Joint Applied Project evaluates current Army contract administration 
procedures, as related to the COR function, to identify improvement areas and best 
practices. We use interviews to validate current contract administration practices and gain 
expert insight into the effectiveness of COR training. We develop recommendations to 
improve COR education, staffing, and leadership support, and summarize best practices 
to streamline the Army’s COR contracting administration duties in both CONUS and 
OCONUS environments. The intended audience for this research is Army leadership, 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) educators, Army contracting personnel, and 
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Army personnel performing contract administration functions. Although we focus on the 




To perform this research, we conducted (1) literature reviews from secondary 
sources and (2) interviews from primary sources. Literature was analyzed from GAO 
reports, DOD and Army publications, DOD IG reports, theses from the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), and other applicable documents. Data gathered from these 
secondary sources proved beneficial in identifying contract administration problems in 
both CONUS and OCONUS environments. We conducted interviews with military and 
civilian personnel with real-world contract administration experience to determine the 
root causes of the problems identified in the literature reviews. We asked Army experts 
for recommended solutions to the contract administration issues in order to 
comprehensively understand how to fix these problems. We compared literature findings, 
government reports, and interviews to identify common themes. 
2. Project Organization 
This project includes five chapters that are organized as follows. Chapter I 
introduces the purpose of the research and identifies the main problem we aim to solve. 
Chapter II presents the literature on COR roles and responsibilities; DOD and Army COR 
regulations, policies, and training; and published reports from the GAO, DOD IG, and 
NPS. Chapter III describes the methodology for data collection; including interview 
questions and processes; and the analysis performed. Chapter IV discusses the results as 
they relate to five key improvement issues for Army contract administration. Chapter V 
details conclusions, recommendations, and areas for further research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter I provided an introduction to this research by explaining the importance 
of contract administration and outlining an overall approach to meeting the research’s 
objectives. This chapter focuses on current literature surrounding CONUS and OCONUS 
CORs. First, we explain what a COR is, how he or she is appointed, and describe the 
COR’s roles and responsibilities. Next, we highlight DOD and Army COR regulations, 
policies, and training requirements for CONUS and OCONUS CORs. Finally, we provide 
a narrative review of what other researchers have written about this subject. 
A. DESCRIPTION OF COR ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
The DOD defines a COR as “an agent of the Government that acts as the eyes and 
ears of the Contracting Officer and as a liaison between the Government and the 
contractor when executing surveillance responsibilities” (Director, Defense Procurement 
Acquisition Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics) (DPAP, OUSD[AT&L]), 2012a, p. 9). The Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 252.201-7000 also defines a COR as “an individual 
designated in accordance with subsection 201.602-2 of the DFARS and authorized in 
writing by the Contracting Officer to perform specific technical and administrative 
functions” (Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement [DFARS], 2016, section 
252.2-7). Ultimately, the customer organization nominates a COR based on the 
complexity of the requirement, and the technical experience and training of the 
individual. 
The contracting process involves three phases: (1) pre-award and solicitation; (2) 
evaluation and contract award; and (3) post-award and contract administration (DPAP, 
OUSD[AT&L], 2012a, p. 52). CORs primarily carry out their responsibilities during the 
contract administration phase; however, CORs do perform some pre-award duties. 
General duties that a COR is involved in during pre-award include: conducting market 
research, preparing the statement of work or performance work statement, developing the 
quality assurance surveillance plan (QASP), preparing the independent government cost 
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estimate (IGCE), and developing a government furnished property list. Because the 
primary focus of this research is on Army contract administration, we focus the 
discussion on that phase of the contracting process. The final and typically longest phase, 
Contract Administration, is an extremely important phase for a COR to perform his or her 
duties, as this phase often determines contract success or failure. A COR serves as a key 
representative to the Contracting Officer as he or she performs contract administration 
duties. Contract administration duties can be quite extensive and involve several 
elements—post-award kick-off meetings; contract compliance measures; contract 
performance monitoring; contract modification actions; invoice and payment processes; 
and contract completion and closeout procedures (DPAP, OUSD[AT&L], 2012a)—all of 
which the COR is involved in to ensure that DOD receives what they paid for. The main 
focus of CORs performing contract administration duties is for the United States 
Government to obtain goods and services that are of the specified quality and within the 
agreed-to cost and schedule parameters (DPAP, OUSD[AT&L], 2012a). 
CORs perform important surveillance functions in ensuring the DOD receives 
quality goods and services within cost, schedule, and performance parameters. CORs are 
critical participants in the contract administration process given the complexity of 
organizational requirements and on-going tasks required to ensure successful contract 
performance. 
CORs should clearly understand their roles and limitations when performing 
contract administration duties. COR roles include serving as the technical representative 
who performs some pre-award tasks, such as developing the statement of work or 
performance work statement, along with post-award tasks, such as contract surveillance 
for the Contracting Officer. Since the COR is the eyes and ears of the Contracting 
Officer, he or she monitors the technical and administrative performance of the contract 
by reporting any issues to the Contracting Officer; as well as evaluating contractor 
performance and responding to contractor questions or issues. 
COR responsibilities are listed in their official COR letter of appointment from 
the Contracting Officer. COR post-award contract administration duties vary from 
contract to contract; however, some common duties include: 
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 Understanding the contract and knowing COR limitations 
 Maintaining regular communications with the contractor, contracting 
officer, and the COR’s supervisor 
 Participating in contract related meetings and filing meeting minutes in 
the contract file 
 Establishing and maintaining accurate and complete contract files 
 Preparing monthly contract status reports for Contracting Officer 
review 
 Managing correspondence and responses 
 Maintaining correspondence with the contractor 
 Preparing correspondence to the Contracting Officer 
 Inspecting and accepting or rejecting contract deliverables from a 
quality perspective based on the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan 
(QASP) 
 Reviewing and approving monthly contractor invoices for payment 
 Managing and safeguarding proprietary and sensitive contract 
information 
 Coordinating with contractor and contracting officer to resolve 
contract problems 
 Managing unsatisfactory contract performance issues 
 Tracking and understanding contract modification impacts 
 Providing technical knowledge to oversee the contract 
 Maintaining COR certification and completing necessary training 
 Concluding COR appointment as necessary per guidelines. (DPAP, 
OUSD[AT&L], 2012a, p. 30–31). 
Appendix A provides a more comprehensive list of COR responsibilities during 
the contract administration phase. 
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B. FEDERAL AND DOD COR REGULATIONS, POLICIES, AND 
TRAINING 
The DOD maintains several regulatory guidelines and policies relating to CORs. 
We provide an overview of those documents as well as required COR training 
requirements for CONUS and OCONUS CORs. 
1. Federal and DOD COR Regulations 
At the federal level, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) codifies the laws 
pertaining to soliciting, awarding, and administering contracts on behalf of the federal 
government. It also provides guidance to members of the acquisition team (particularly 
Contracting Officers) to ensure uniform application of contracting procedures across all 
federal entities. FAR 1.602-2, paragraph (d) discusses the responsibilities of Contracting 
Officers.  
Contracting Officers shall designate and authorize, in writing and in 
accordance with agency procedures, a contracting officer’s representative 
(COR) on all contracts and orders other than those that are firm-fixed 
price, and for firm-fixed price contracts and orders as appropriate, unless 
the contracting officer retains and executes the COR duties. [The 
paragraph also mandates that] the COR shall be a government employee 
(unless other agency regulations permit non-governmental employees to 
conduct COR duties)1; [the COR] shall be certified and maintain 
certification in accordance with [federal acquisition certification 
guidelines]; [the COR] shall be qualified by training and experience 
commensurate with the [COR] responsibilities; [the COR] may not be 
delegated responsibility to perform functions that have been delegated 
under FAR 42.202 to a contract administration office; [the COR] has no 
authority to make any commitments or changes that affect price, quality, 
quantity, delivery, or other terms and conditions of the contract nor in any 
way direct the contractor or its subcontractors to operate in conflict with 
the contract terms and conditions; [the COR] shall be nominated either by 
the requiring activity or in accordance with agency procedures; and [the 
COR] shall be designated in writing, with copies furnished to the 
contractor and the contract administration office [which outlines] the 
COR’s authority to act on behalf of the contracting officer [during the 
                                                 
1 The Defense supplement to the FAR, known as the DFARS, explicitly states that, for defense 
contracts, CORs shall be “an employee, military or civilian, of the U.S. Government, a foreign government, 
or a North Atlantic Treaty Organization/coalition partner. In no case shall contractor personnel serve as 
CORs” (DFARS 201.602-2). 
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specified] period covered by the designation. (Federal Acquisition 
Regulation [FAR], 2016, section 1.602-2(d)(1-7iii))  
The FAR has a selective process in place to designate a COR. 
At the DOD level, DFARS, subpart 201.602-2, current edition, is the DOD 
supplemental regulation to the FAR that is used to officially appoint CORs. For the DOD, 
when a Contracting Officer intends to appoint a COR to a contract, he or she must insert 
clause DFARS 252.201-7000, Contracting Officer’s Representative (DEC 1991), into the 
solicitation and resulting contract. This clause:  
defines a COR as an individual designated in accordance with [DFARS] 
subsection 201.602-2 and authorized in writing by the Contracting Officer 
to perform specific technical or administrative functions. [This clause also 
states that] if the Contracting Officer designates a COR, the contractor will 
receive a copy of the written designation; the designation will specify the 
extent of the COR’s authority to act on behalf of the Contracting Officer; 
the COR is not authorized to make any commitments or changes that will 
affect price, quality, quantity, delivery, or any other term or condition of 
the contract. (DFARS, 2016, clause 252.201-7000) 
In addition to the FAR and DFARS, DOD agencies are also subject to DOD 
Instruction 5000.72, dated 26 March 2015, which establishes uniform DOD policies for 
identifying, developing, certifying, and managing CORs. This document standardizes the 
way the service components and defense support agencies assign, train, certify, and 
manage their CORs. It is a key document for DOD agencies, Contracting Officers, 
Combatant Commanders, CORs, requiring activities, and supervisors of CORs. This 
DOD Instruction has several enclosures outlining contract administration responsibilities, 
procedures for designating a COR, COR nomination process, qualification requirements 
for CORs, and examples of COR responsibilities and COR certification requirements. 
2. DOD COR Guides and Policies 
The primary guides utilized by Army CORs are the DOD COR Handbook and the 
Defense Contingency COR Handbook. The DOD COR Handbook, dated 22 March 2012, 
is the overarching resource that addresses contract surveillance, roles and responsibilities 
of key stakeholders such as the Contracting Officer, the COR, and the COR’s supervisor. 
This document serves as a supplement to COR surveillance from a training and 
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performance perspective. Equally important is the Defense Contingency COR Handbook, 
version 2, dated September 2012, which serves as a comprehensive guide for 
stakeholders involved in COR related functions in contingency environments. It covers 
topics such as the importance of contract surveillance, ethics and integrity, and 
monitoring service contracts in a contingency environment. This Contingency handbook 
also addresses OCONUS COR specific roles, responsibilities, and training.  
Beyond these guides, the DOD also issues policy and guidance notices, which are 
produced whenever the existing COR policy changes. These notices provide detailed 
descriptions of the changes as well as implementation instructions. 
DFARS Procedures, Guidance, and Information (PGI) 201.602-2(d)(i)(A), dated 
30 October 2015, requires that: 
Contracting Officers designate a COR for all service contracts, including 
both firm-fixed-price and other than firm-fixed-price contracts, awarded 
by a DOD component or by any other Federal agency on behalf of [the] 
DOD. The surveillance activities performed by CORs should be tailored to 
the dollar value/complexity of the specific contract for which they are 
designated. For geographically dispersed large contracts with multiple task 
orders, contracting officers should consider appointing multiple or 
alternate CORs to assist with surveillance duties. These CORs should have 
specific duties based on criteria, such as geographic region or distinct task 
areas, to avoid conflicting or duplicative direction. Contracting officers, 
[however], may exempt service contracts from this requirement when the 
following three conditions are met: (1) the contract will be awarded using 
simplified acquisition procedures; (2) the requirement is not complex; and 
(3) the Contracting Officer documents the file, in writing, with the specific 
reasons why the appointment of a COR is unnecessary. (DFARS, 2015, 
subsection 201.602-2(d)(i)(A)) 
DOD COR policy outlined in the DOD Instruction 5000.72, dated 26 March 2015 
consists of the following main COR points:  
(1) all CORs must be employees, military or civilian, of the U.S. 
Government, a foreign government, or North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
partner; (2) Contracting Officers will designate a COR for all service 
contracts unless the Contracting Officer retains and executes oversight 
duties of the contract; (3) a qualified COR is appointed for all contracts or 
orders placed for DOD requirements; (4) [contract] surveillance activities, 
performed by CORs, are [based on] the dollar value, complexity, and risk 
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of the procurement; (5) minimum COR competencies, experience, and 
training are based on the dollar value, complexity, [and risk of] the 
requirement;2 and (6) Contracting Officers shall determine if COR duties 
meet the criteria for filing a Confidential Financial Disclosure Report [and 
if so], the Contracting Officer will instruct the COR to complete OGE 
Form 450. (Department of Defense [DOD], 2015, pp. 2–3)  
In addition to guides and policy, Defense memorandums are produced as necessary to 
address specific topics and changes in requirements for CORs. To illustrate how they are 
used, we discuss two recent memorandums that have a COR focus. The Office of the 
Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Update to the Department of Defense Contracting 
Officer’s Representative Tracking (CORT) Tool,” dated 10 February 2014, is a policy 
document that mandates all Military and DOD activities to utilize the CORT Tool when 
designating a COR. The DOD CORT Tool is a web-based system for appointing DOD 
CORs. Another important memorandum is the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Memorandum, “Monitoring Contract Performance in Contracts for Services,” dated 22 
August 2008. This policy document mandates the involvement of the requiring 
organization and COR supervisor in the COR nomination process and requires them to 
provide the COR with the necessary resources (e.g., funding, time, training, people, or 
equipment) to perform COR duties. 
3. DOD COR Training 
The “DOD Standard for COR Service Acquisitions is the standard which defines 
the minimum competencies, experience, and training type required for a qualified COR to 
be appointed,” including refresher training guidelines (DPAP, OUSD[AT&L], 2012a, p. 
148). This Standard is based on the complexity and type of requirement being procured, 
as well as the overall contract performance risk. The DOD COR Training standard is 
geared toward establishing structure and uniformity to COR responsibilities, training 
certifications, and performance expectations. The three types are: 
Type A is for fixed priced contracts that have no incentives and have a 
low performance risk level. The required COR training is (1) COR with a 
                                                 
2 There are three types of COR appointments: Type A, Type B, and Type C. We discuss the 
competencies, experience, and training for each type of appointment later in this chapter. 
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Mission Focus (DAU CLC 106) unless Contracting Officer’s 
Representative (DAU CLC 222) training has been completed; (2) Ethics 
for AT&L Workforce (DAU CLM-003) or agency equivalent; (3) 
Combatting Trafficking in Persons (CTIP) Awareness; (4) Invoicing, 
Receipt, Acceptance, and Property Transfer (IRAPT) formally known as 
Wide Area Work Flow (WAWF); and (5) DOD CORT Tool Overview. 
Additional training is required if the COR is, or is going to be, deployed: 
CORs in the Contingency Environment (DAU CLC 206) and 
Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) system 
training. (DOD, 2015, p. 27) 
 
Type B is for all other than fixed priced contracts that have a performance 
risk level other than low. The required COR training is (1) Contracting 
Officer’s Representative (DAU CLC 222) on-line training, or an 
equivalent 36+ hour in-person COR course, or the Army Logistics 
University (ALU) 40 hour COR course; (2) Ethics for AT&L Workforce 
(DAU CLM-003) or agency equivalent; (3) Combatting Trafficking in 
Persons (CTIP) Awareness; (4) Invoicing, Receipt, Acceptance, and 
Property Transfer (IRAPT) formally known as Wide Area Work Flow 
(WAWF); and (5) DOD CORT Tool Overview. Additional training is 
required if the COR is, or is going to be, deployed: CORs in the 
Contingency Environment (DAU CLC 206) and SPOT system training.  
(DOD, 2015, p. 28) 
 
Type C is for unique requirements that require a professional license, 
higher education, or some form of specialized training. The required COR 
training is (1) Contracting Officer’s Representative (DAU CLC 222) on-
line training, or an equivalent 36+ hour in-person COR course, or the 
Army Logistics University (ALU) 40 hour COR course; (2) Ethics for 
AT&L Workforce (DAU CLM-003) or agency equivalent; (3) Combatting 
Trafficking in Persons (CTIP) Awareness; (4) Invoicing, Receipt, 
Acceptance, and Property Transfer (IRAPT) formally known as Wide 
Area Work Flow (WAWF); and (5) DOD CORT Tool Overview. 
Additional training is required if the COR is, or is going to be, deployed: 
CORs in the Contingency Environment (DAU CLC 206) and SPOT 
system training. (DOD, 2015, p. 29) 
Appendix B briefly describes these DOD COR training courses. 
4. DOD COR Experience 
Agency experience is another element of the DOD Standard for CORs. For Type 
A CORs, the standard experience required is six months. Type B and C CORs shall have 
at least 12 months of agency-specific experience (DOD, 2015). The Contracting Officer 
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does have the authority to waive such required experience, if requested and justified by 
COR management. 
5. DOD COR Competencies 
Possessing certain competencies and performance attributes are required elements 
of the DOD Standard for CORs. Such competencies are acquired through experience, 
formal education, and/or training. Those competencies vary based on the type of COR 
appointment. Competencies for Type A appointments include: attention to detail; making 
decisions while remaining flexible; communicating orally and in writing; solving 
problems through reasoning; teamwork; self-management initiative; business ethics; and 
effective COR and contract performance.  
Competencies for Type B and C appointments include: analytical, project 
management, and strategic skills; knowledge of the contract type and overall 
marketplace; planning and evaluation skills; and effective interpersonal skills such as 
being influential and persuasive (DOD, 2015). It is important to remember that the DOD 
Standard is based on the complexity and type of requirement being procured along with 
the overall contract performance risk; therefore each type of COR appointment is unique 
and is not based on progression from a Type A to a Type C.  
Detailed descriptions of COR required competencies, experience, and training are 
outlined in Tables 1, 2, and 3. 
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Table 1.   DOD Standard for Certification of CORs—Type A. 
Source: DOD (2015, p. 27). 
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Table 2.   DOD Standard for Certification of CORs—Type B. 
Source: DOD (2015, p. 28). 
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Table 3.   DOD Standard for Certification of CORs—Type C. 
Source: DOD (2015, p. 29). 
C. ARMY COR REGULATIONS, POLICIES, AND TRAINING 
This section outlines the Department of the Army’s regulatory guidelines and 
policies relating to CORs. The Department of the Army utilizes the DOD’s COR training 
standards as outlined in the preceding section. Additional Army-specific COR training 
requirements for CONUS or OCONUS CORs are provided in this section. 
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1. Army COR Regulation 
“The Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS) implements 
and supplements the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the Defense FAR 
Supplement (DFARS) and the DFARS Procedures, Guidance, and Information (PGI) to 
establish uniform policies for Army acquisitions” (Army Federal Acquisition Regulation 
System [AFARS], 2016, subpart 5101.101). AFARS, part 5101.602-2-91, current edition, 
is the Army supplemental regulation that provides direct information about COR 
appointments at the Army level. Paragraph (a) permits Contracting Officers to “designate 
a properly trained COR prior to contract award consistent with DFARS 201.602-2.” 
Paragraph (b) strictly directs the Contracting Officers to “allow 45 calendar days after 
receipt of the procurement package for the requiring activity to satisfy all COR 
requirements and if, after 45 days, a COR has not been properly trained and nominated, 
the Contracting Officer will cease further action and return the procurement package to 
the requiring activity.” Paragraph (c) directs Contracting Officers to “validate COR and 
ordering records every 12 months in accordance with DFARS PGI, as well as document 
the review in the contract file” (AFARS, 2016, subpart 5101.602-2-91). 
2. Army COR Policies and Guides 
The Army has developed specific guidance and policy guides that support federal 
and DOD policy of CONUS and OCONUS COR functions to better explain the broad 
policy down to the Army level. Because the DOD policy, guidance, and instructions are 
broad, and thus open for interpretation, the Army generated supporting guidance and 
documentation so that Army CORs can better understand what is expected of them at the 
Army level. For example, in the Army Contracting Command (ACC) COR Handbook, 
which fully supports the DOD COR Handbook, Army templates are provided concerning 
COR Monthly reports, COR Appointment Letters, COR Termination Letters, and Annual 
COR File Review Checklist. Next, we identify and discuss Army COR financial 
contingency guidance, policy guides, and handbooks. 
The Department of the Army Financial Management Guidance for Contingency 
Operations, dated 12 November 2015, addresses an important program called the 
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Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). “The Army is the executive agent 
for appropriated CERP funding executed by U.S. Forces Afghanistan” (Department of 
the Army [DA], 2015, p. 14). CERP provides critical funding capability for ground 
commanders while conducting stability, economic development, and urgent humanitarian 
assistance operations in support of contingency operations. In contingency environments, 
CORs can expect to administer and survey projects relating to “(1) water and sanitation; 
(2) food production and distribution; (3) agriculture and irrigation; (4) electricity 
production/distribution [such as purchasing generators]; (5) telecommunications; (6) 
repair of civic/cultural facilities; (7) education [to reconstruct schools and purchase 
school supplies]; (8) health care; (9) transportation [such as purchasing or leasing 
vehicles to support efforts]; and (10) repair battle damage for losses incurred as a result 
of U.S., coalition or supporting military operations” (DA, 2015, p. 21). 
The ACC has developed two Contracting Officer’s Representative Policy Guides 
that Army CORs use frequently. The Interim ACC Contracting Officer’s Representative 
Policy Guide, ACC Pamphlet 70–1, dated 26 March 2010, provides guidance to CORs 
and describes the training and management strategy for CORs to ensure ethical behavior 
and continuity of standards across the ACC. This document is applicable to Contracting 
Officers, CORs, COR Supervisors, and Army Analysts tracking COR training.  
The Army Contracting Command-Aberdeen Proving Ground (ACC-APG) 
Contracting Officer’s Representative Handbook, dated August 2011 provides Army 
CORs with information on training and qualifications, an automated nomination process, 
duties for specific commodity areas, responsibilities, contract documentation, reporting 
requirements, and Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan development. This Army COR 
Handbook is consistent with the DOD COR Handbook. It serves as an additional guide 
for CORs appointed by the ACC-APG to better assist CORs in performing contract 
oversight functions from a broad perspective, as well as a local perspective. This 
handbook is applicable to Contracting Officers, CORs, COR Supervisors, and Army 
Policy Analysts. 
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3. Army COR Training 
Army COR Training utilizes the DOD COR training standards as cited in the 
“DOD COR Training” section for Type A, Type B, and Type C CORs. Additionally, 
Contracting Officers may determine that an Army COR requires additional contract 
specific training such as: Operations Security (OPSEC); Contractor Performance 
Assessment Reporting System (CPARS); Contractor Manpower Reporting Application 
(CMRA); Electronic Document Access (EDA), Local Vendor Base; Survival Evasion 
Resistance and Escape (SERE); Country specific pre-deployment; Language/dialect; 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA); and Theater Business Clearance (TBC). Additional 
training is specific to the requirements of the contract or functions assigned to the COR 
by the contracting officer. Appendix C provides a more detailed description of these 
courses/applications. 
D. PUBLISHED COR-RELATED REPORTS (GAO/IG/NPS) 
The authors analyzed Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, DOD 
and Army publications, Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) reports, 
theses from the Naval Postgraduate School, and other documents in order to determine 
commonalities and trends associated with Army contract administration in regard to 
CORs. The authors identified four common trends: (1) insufficient number of CORs, (2) 
systemic lack of training, (3) inadequate technical experience, and (4) inadequate QASPs 
to measure contractor performance. 
1. Insufficient Number of CORs 
On multiple occasions, the GAO and the DOD IG identified the problem of an 
insufficient number of CORs monitoring and administering both CONUS and OCONUS 
contracts. The thousands of contracts in Afghanistan and Iraq had too few CORs for 
proper oversight (GAO, 2012). 
Additionally, the DOD IG (2015b) identified that the “Army Field Support 
Battalion—Kuwait did not provide appropriate [personnel to perform] contract oversight 
to validate” the necessity of repair orders and to verify the accuracy of labor hours billed 
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on many construction contracts (p. 12). Because an insufficient number of CORs 
performed oversight, many CORs became overloaded with construction contracts to 
oversee in theater, making it impossible for a COR to be present at each construction site 
when major milestones took place. As a result, problems were not identified until 
buildings were already completed. This resulted in significant safety risks and 
considerable rework for the DOD, the cost of which ultimately fell on the U.S. taxpayer 
(GAO, 2011). 
Another example involved an insufficient number of CORs providing oversight of 
dining facilities in Afghanistan (GAO, 2012). Army guidance requires CORs to “check 
food for sanitation and safety at all dining facilities at every meal period” (GAO, 2012, p. 
25). With a limited number of CORs available to verify food preparation procedures, the 
health and safety of military and civilian personnel were put at risk, which could 
ultimately impact combat effectiveness. 
In a CONUS contingency example, the GAO (2008) found that “in the aftermath 
of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the number of government personnel monitoring 
contracts was not always sufficient or effectively deployed to provide adequate 
oversight” ( p. 9). This resulted in a state of flux, and oversight personnel had difficulty 
confirming what goods and services were supplied during a major crisis within the 
CONUS. 
The general theme from these secondary sources is that the DOD acquisition 
workforce’s workload and the complexity of contract requirements to be surveyed 
continues to grow; however, the DOD has not provided an adequate number of oversight 
personnel on CONUS and OCONUS contracts, which increases the risk to DOD missions 
and personnel and reduces the DOD’s ability to be sure it received what it paid for. 
Moreover, since 2011, the DOD has been drawing down U.S. forces in contingency 
environments. Current legislation limiting the number of boots on the ground in 
OCONUS environments exacerbates the problem, as even fewer CORs are available to 
perform contract oversight. 
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2. Systemic Lack of Training 
On multiple occasions, GAO and DOD IG officials identified a systemic lack of 
training for CONUS and OCONUS CORs. GAO investigators identified that CORs are 
not prepared to perform their duties overseeing contracts because the mandatory COR 
training does not teach CORs how to generate statements of work and how to function in 
a contingency environment (GAO, 2011). Additionally, GAO and Army investigators 
found that the insufficient number and lack of training among CORs responsible for 
overseeing contractors performing prisoner interrogation services at Abu Ghraib prison in 
Iraq left the Army unable to properly measure contractor performance and attend to 
contractor personnel conduct issues at the prison (GAO, 2008).  
In Afghanistan, the DOD IG identified that the Defense Contract Management 
Agency (DCMA) and the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command 
(ISAFJC) personnel did not always provide contract-specific Field Mentorship training to 
CORs that were responsible for oversight of the Afghan National Police contract, which 
left the DOD vulnerable in safety and security measures. As a result, DCMA and ISAFJC 
leaders could not verify that the Army received the fielded mentoring services purchased 
by contract (DOD IG, 2015b). 
The GAO (2012) also identified gaps in the COR training curriculum. For 
instance, the training focused on low-risk contracts and did not fully address real-world 
high-risk contract arrangements, leaving CORs unable to understand the full scope of 
their responsibilities and unable to fully ensure that contract requirements were met in 
both CONUS and OCONUS environments. As a result of CORs not understanding the 
full scope of their responsibilities, “items such as portable toilets, security gates, water, 
and other items or services were not available when needed, and [raised] concerns about 
security, military readiness, hygiene, and morale” (p. 11). 
The DOD is still working on providing resolutions to all of the findings; however, 
they did develop a new contingency-focused COR training course to improve COR skills 
in providing contract administration and oversight support. Additionally, “DOD took 
steps to institutionalize operational contract support by including some COR related 
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training in professional military education programs and by emphasizing the need for 
qualified CORs by discussing their responsibilities in joint doctrine” (GAO, 2012, p. 10). 
Although the DOD has taken steps in the past few years to improve existing COR 
training, inadequacies remain in the program. A large number of CORs are still not fully 
prepared to perform their contract administration duties. Having inadequately trained 
CORs performing contract oversight can lead to fraud and waste in both CONUS and 
OCONUS environments. 
3. Inadequate Technical Experience 
On multiple occasions, the GAO identified that CORs have inadequate technical 
experience to perform their contract oversight duties in both CONUS and OCONUS 
environments. The GAO (2012) identified that “CORs do not always have the necessary 
technical knowledge or reach back capabilities to subject matter experts possessing those 
technical skills to effectively oversee technical and complex contracts in Afghanistan” (p. 
18). Specifically, CORs appointed to provide oversight to construction contracts often 
lacked any engineering or construction experience. That lack of technical experience 
required the “newly constructed buildings to be repaired or rebuilt before service 
members could use the facilities” since the CORs could not ensure the safety of the 
buildings (GAO, 2012, p.18). In this case, inadequate technical experience wasted time 
and money, caused low service member morale, and increased risk to the safety of 
personnel who used these buildings. 
The increasing complexity of Army contracts requires well trained and technically 
skilled personnel in order to perform effective contract surveillance and oversight. The 
GAO report (2012) identified an occurrence where 
a COR prepared a statement of work for a contract to build floors and 
install tents but failed to include any power requirements which is 
necessary to run air conditioners, heaters, and lights because the COR did 
not possess any electrical technical expertise to properly and safely specify 
the correct power converter package. (p. 19) 
As a result of the COR’s lack of technical experience, the contractor set up tents that 
were unusable until the contractor installed the correct power converters at an additional 
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cost to the taxpayer. The GAO stated that the issue of CORs not possessing the necessary 
technical expertise has been a longstanding problem and remains a problem within DOD 
CONUS and OCONUS environments. 
4. Inadequate QASPs to Measure Contractor Performance 
On multiple occasions, DOD IG officials identified inadequate QASPs to measure 
contractor performance in both CONUS and OCONUS environments. A fully developed 
and appropriate QASP is vital to ensuring contractors perform according to the contract’s 
schedule, meet the contract’s requirements, and employ adequately skilled personnel to 
perform required tasks. 
DOD IG investigators identified that PEO Aviation personnel responsible for the 
Mi-17 aircraft overhaul did not develop a QASP, nor designate a COR to perform 
contract surveillance and oversight (DOD IG, 2013). 
Another DOD IG investigation revealed that CORs from the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers New York District office, who were responsible for monitoring contractor 
performance for a Hurricane Sandy contract, made minimal visits to the site of contract 
performance. Instead, the COR relied on program representatives to monitor quality 
assurance controls and overall contract progress (DOD IG, 2015a). In this case, the COR 
did not verify contractor performance against the QASP. In both DOD IG cases, the 
CORs did not use QASPs to measure contractor performance. 
In another report, DOD IG investigators identified that PEO STRI officials did 
not prepare an adequate QASP to be used in measuring contractor performance for the 
Joint Multinational Readiness Center contract. The COR developed the QASP for the 
PEO STRI effort using a generic template but did not include specific metrics for 
monitoring the performance of major portions of the performance work statement (PWS), 
such as assessing how well the contractor maintained the exportable instrumentation 
system (DOD IG, 2014). As a result of having an inadequate QASP, PEO STRI did not 
fully use the instrumentation system as intended and outlined in the PWS and PEO STRI 
ended up paying for an underused system (DOD IG, 2014). The DOD IG recommended 
that PEO STRI update and revise the QASP in accordance with FAR 46.4 guidelines. The 
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Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement commented that “the revised 
QASP will include specific methods of surveillance; frequency of surveillance; a 
checklist providing detailed surveillance information specific to each effort for the CORs 
and Quality Assurance Representatives; and a matrix tying performance measures back to 
the PWS” (DOD IG, 2014, p. 16). 
In another report, DOD IG (2015b) investigators discovered that:  
CORs for the Afghan National Police contract did not conduct effective 
contractor surveillance. The CORs failed to complete the required audit 
checklists based on assigned risk levels. Audit checklists had not always 
been completed and even when they were, certain items had not been 
completed. In addition, CORs had inconsistent information when 
communicating oversight results. Investigators reviewed 166 audit 
checklists and found that 147 audit checklists generated by CORs did not 
properly document contractor noncompliance. As a result of CORs not 
adequately performing surveillance against a QASP, DCMA personnel 
could not verify that the Army fully received approximately $20.9 million 
per month of services paid under the Afghan National Police contract. (p. 9) 
Investigators recommended ACC-Rock Island Contracting coordinate with key 
stakeholders by updating the audit checklists and the QASP as necessary every time there 
is a modification to the contract SOW in order to be able to adequately verify services 
were rendered on the Afghan National Police contract (DOD IG, 2015b). 
A final DOD IG audit identified that the Army’s Ebola Fight contract failed to 
have an acceptable QASP in place to ensure proper oversight, and that Contracting 
Officers appointed untrained CORs to the contract. As a result, CORs were not able to 
ensure how the contractor spent $33.8 million intended for basic life support services, 
which was partially due to the lack of COR training and not using an adequate QASP to 
properly measure contractor performance (Sege, 2015). Although the Army was 
functioning at a high tempo to combat the Ebola epidemic, fully trained and 
knowledgeable CORs should have developed adequate QASPs in order to measure 
contractor performance. 
Based upon review and analysis of published COR-related literature, we found 
four key trends that must be addressed, as they affect the Army’s ability to efficiently and 
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effectively perform contract administration. The four key areas are (1) insufficient 
number of CORs, (2) systemic lack of training, (3) inadequate technical experience, and 
(4) inadequate QASPs to measure contractor performance. These four improvement areas 
are vital to proper contract oversight and surveillance to ensure the Army receives full 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
The primary objective of this research project is to examine and analyze Army 
contract administration procedures in CONUS and OCONUS performed by CORs for 
service contracts. By analyzing COR roles, responsibilities, training, surveillance trends 
and interview results, we provide Army Contracting leadership with recommendations to 
improve Army COR contract administration in CONUS and OCONUS by leveraging 
lessons learned and best practices. 
Data gathered from the literature review proved beneficial to developing 
interview questions that further examine COR-related contract administration procedures. 
In order to examine how COR roles, responsibilities, training, and surveillance differed 
between CONUS and OCONUS, we used structured interviews to uncover the nuances of 
each role in different locations.  
A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND THE INTERVIEW PROCESS 
We used three types of interview questions based on the role of the individual 
being interviewed (COR, Leader/Supervisor, Commander). A total of eight structured 
interviews took place from 4 May to 3 June 2016. Interviews were performed at the 
authors’ offices, primarily face-to-face (one telephone interview occurred).  
Each interview aimed to identify problems within the Army’s contract 
administration process by identifying gaps in current CONUS and OCONUS COR 
activities. A full version of the interview questions can be found in Appendices D 
through F; however, three sample questions provided later in this section demonstrate 
how the questions relate to the objective of the research. Information obtained during the 
interviews has been secured and no personally identifiable information was collected, as 
all the information provided during the interviews was analyzed and aggregated into 
common areas of focus. 
Sample interview questions used during the interviews are provided next. The 
interviews validated systemic problems within the Army’s contract administration 
procedures as they relate to CORs in both CONUS and OCONUS environments and 
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helped determine how contract administration could be improved so that CORs can 
provide more efficient and effective contract administration support. 
1. COR Sample Question 
Did you receive adequate COR training to perform COR duties either in a 
CONUS or OCONUS environment? This question determines whether the required COR 
training successfully prepared CORs to perform the variety of contract administration 
duties expected of them.  
2. Leaders/Supervisors of CORs Sample Question 
Do you review and approve Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans (QASPs) 
within your organization? If so, what key aspects of the QASP do you look for to ensure 
sound surveillance practices are conducted? This question determines whether leaders 
and supervisors of CORs are knowledgeable about QASPs and surveillance requirements, 
and gives insight into whether QASPs are being developed and used correctly to monitor 
contractor performance in accordance with the contract. 
3. Commanders of CORs Sample Question 
Are you familiar with the roles and responsibilities of CORs in a CONUS or 
OCONUS environment? This question seeks to understand whether or not commanders 
of CORs have the fundamental knowledge and understanding of the magnitude of duties 
expected of CORs that they are overseeing in order to determine whether realistic 
expectations are being set. 
B. SAMPLE 
Interview candidates had real world experience either as an Army COR or 
managing Army CORs overseeing contracts. Additionally, the OCONUS CORs and the 
commanders, leaders, and supervisors of CORs had recent and relevant experience of the 
OCONUS contract administration processes, as they had recently been deployed to 
Kuwait, Afghanistan, and/or Iraq. We interviewed two Commanders overseeing CORs, 
two Leaders/Supervisors overseeing CORs, two CONUS CORs and two OCONUS 
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CORs. Of the eight Army participants, two were military contracting professionals (25%) 
and six were civilian personnel (75%).  
The interview participants had a moderate amount of contracting and COR 
experience throughout their careers. CONUS CORs oversaw an average of eight active 
contracts and had a little over four years of contracting experience. OCONUS CORs 
oversaw an average of ten active contracts with three years of contracting experience and 
an average of nine months of deployment experience. Leaders/Supervisors of CORs 
managed an average of thirteen active contracts and had approximately four years of 
contracting experience. Commanders of CORs managed an average of 51 active contracts 
and had an average of six years contracting experience and an average of 12 months of 
deployment experience. 
C. ANALYSIS 
To consolidate the results of the interviews, we highlighted words, phrases, and 
sentences of relevant information from each interview while capturing candid COR 
experiences. Information was deemed relevant when interviewees repeated information, 
or the interviewee explicitly stated that it was important, or similar contract 
administration issues appeared in previously published reports (e.g., DOD IG or GAO 
reports). After consolidation of relevant information, we identified commonalities 
between the literature findings, government reports, and the interviews.  
Identification of gaps in the contract administration processes occurred across the 
command, leadership/supervisor, and COR levels. Detailed results from the interviews 
and an understanding of how contract administration issues affect operations in both 
CONUS and OCONUS environments are presented in Chapter IV. 
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IV. RESULTS 
This chapter provides results from the interviews and previously published reports 
grouped based on the following five common COR issues that need to be addressed: 
education/training, communication, staff levels, oversight, and leadership support. The 
effects these issues have on contract administration operations in both CONUS and 
OCONUS environments will be discussed. 
A. EDUCATION /TRAINING 
The interview results suggested a need for further COR education/training on the 
following topics: (1) OCONUS operations; (2) Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan 
(QASP) development and use; and (3) understanding contract financing.  
1. OCONUS Operations 
The primary difference in education and training among CONUS CORs and 
OCONUS CORs is that OCONUS CORs require additional training. CONUS and 
OCONUS CORs must take the DOD Standard training as outlined in Chapter II; 
however, OCONUS CORs have to also take additional theater-specific training, such as 
DAU CLC 206 Contingency COR course, Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational 
Tracker (SPOT) system training, and learning how to generate Letters of Authorization 
(LOAs) and Theater Business Clearances (TBCs). 
Even though the DOD enhanced some of the COR course material, the current 
DOD Standard for COR training remains inadequate. The GAO (2012) “found that CORs 
are not prepared to oversee contracts because the required training does not include 
specifics on how to complete written statements of work and how to operate in 
Afghanistan’s unique contracting environment” (p. 2). The GAO (2011) provided a 
specific example of how the DAU COR Contingency course is lacking, saying that “the 
required training does not provide CORs with information regarding important issue 
areas like the Afghan First Program, which encourages an increased use of local 
personnel and vendors for goods and services as part of the U.S. counterinsurgency 
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strategy” (p. 5). The interviews validate that the COR training remains inadequate, with 
six out of the eight respondents citing this problem. When asked whether he had received 
adequate COR training to perform COR duties, one CONUS COR indicated that the 
DAU on-line COR training is inadequate and insufficient to prepare CORs for realistic 
execution of COR duties. Another COR responded that “the 40-hour COR course just 
teaches you the basics of surveillance concerning a best case scenario firm-fixed price 
contract and was not realistic considering I oversee cost-plus fixed fee contracts.”  
Additional COR training deficiencies noted during the interviews include: (1) 
OCONUS CORs require training in adjudicating contractor personnel in-country 
privileges and security measures within the SPOT system; (2) OCONUS CORs require 
training in cultural heritage and customary practices in Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly 
as it relates to accepting gifts; and (3) OCONUS senior leadership needs to be educated 
about the support and commitment required during the post-award contracting phase. The 
GAO (2012) validated the lack of senior leadership post-award contract training by 
stating that “Not all oversight personnel such as commanders and senior leaders receive 
training to perform contract oversight and management of duties in Afghanistan because 
such training is not required of them” (p. 2). 
2. QASP Training 
A second education/training problem concerns the lack of in-depth training on 
QASPs. A common theme in all the interviews was that CORs (in both CONUS and 
OCONUS) do not know how to develop meaningful and measurable QASPs, nor do they 
know how to use the QASP when performing contract oversight. When CORs were asked 
whether they had ever developed a QASP, and to name key elements of the QASP, three 
out of four (75%) CORs interviewed said they had not developed a QASP nor could they 
name the key elements of a QASP. One CONUS COR said, “we use generic statements 
in the QASP, but the QASPs are not being used because we don’t have the time to do all 
the inspections to the multiple contracts given the hours available in a day.”  
When CORs were asked whether they performed on-site surveillance as 
prescribed in the QASP, one OCONUS COR responded, “No, I performed surveillance 
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based on experience of knowing what proper quality assurance is because the contract 
QASP was generic and did not relate to the task being performed in theater.” Moreover, a 
recent DOD IG report (2014) discussed how “PEO STRI officials did not adequately 
monitor and assess contractor performance because contracting officials did not develop 
an adequate QASP describing methods for on-site quality assurance representatives to 
assess performance of specific services” (p. 9).  
Results of the interviews showed that CORs would like to have COR training on 
how to develop a detailed QASP that measures performance and they would also like to 
have a training class that shows CORs how to actually use the QASP in performing 
contract surveillance. This is certainly an area that the DOD needs to research and expand 
upon in future COR training offerings. 
3. Financial Training 
During the interviews, several leaders and commanders of CORs mentioned that 
CORs are not properly trained in tracking contract financials, such as reviewing 
contractor invoices and verifying against contractor performance, and tracking contract 
burn rates. For example, Type B CORs need to be trained in financial management in 
order to accurately track contract finances. The financial management expertise among 
Army CORs is often inadequate—one interviewee mentioned that quite often Cost and 
Price Analysts assist CORs in tracking expenditures and overall contract burn rates. 
4. Summary of Results 
The effects of Army CONUS and OCONUS CORs not being properly educated 
and trained makes the Army vulnerable to possibly paying full price without receiving 
full value for goods and services received. When Army CORs lack the proper training 
and technical expertise to oversee contracting efforts, it allows contractors to deviate 
from the contract specifications by cutting corners and using sub-standard materials, 
which can increase safety and security risks for service members and civilian personnel. 
Inadequate quality assurance surveillance practices and inadequate technical experience 
of CORs undermines the entire contracting process and puts Army personnel at risk. 
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B. COMMUNICATION 
Effective communication is essential in the business world and absolutely vital in 
the Army, given the high risk associated with Army operations. Communication includes 
verbal, written, and listening skills. Both CONUS and OCONUS CORs must 
communicate with contracting, quality assurance, legal, contractor, logistics, and other 
functional area personnel in order for contract administration to be successful. Interview 
results and previously published reports suggest a need for improved communication on 
the following topics: (1) transition time between outgoing and incoming CORs; (2) 
Contracting Officers and CORs; and (3) OCONUS language barriers for CORs.  
1. Transition Time 
Transitioning between CONUS and OCONUS CORs duties is a challenge that 
five out of eight interviewees commented on. The main problem is that outgoing CORs 
are not communicating with the Contracting Officer or the incoming COR. As Army 
CORs change, they should be communicating pertinent information about the contract 
administration history, financial and invoicing details, existing oversight and surveillance 
aspects, and sharing the COR contract file. In order to have a proper transition, 
communication needs to take place well in advance of the actual turnover. One 
Commander of OCONUS CORs mentioned that “better transition among OCONUS 
CORs is necessary, especially if a COR has issues on a high priority service contract as 
there should be at least two to four weeks of overlap so the new COR can get a better 
overview of the effort.” 
2. Contracting Officer—COR Communication 
Inadequate communication between Contracting Officers and CORs continues to 
be an issue for OCONUS CORs. Both OCONUS CORs commented about the inadequate 
and untimely communications they experienced with CONUS Contracting Officers. 
When asked if Contracting Officers provided timely and accurate responses to COR 
related questions, one OCONUS COR said, “No” while another OCONUS COR said, 
“the Contracting Officer was not helpful nor available when I needed to talk due to the 
time difference.” Additionally, an OCONUS COR mentioned that “CONUS Contracting 
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Officers did not know what was going on in theater nor could they relate to those types of 
unusual situations.” 
Contrary to poor communication between CONUS Contracting Officers and 
OCONUS CORs, the communication between CONUS Contracting Officers and 
CONUS CORs is adequate, timely, and accurate information is exchanged. Collaboration 
between Contracting Officers and CORs is essential to providing effective oversight and 
surveillance of Army contracts. It is evident that distance matters; and OCONUS CORs 
are looking for more effective and efficient reach back capabilities from CONUS 
contracting personnel. 
3. OCONUS Language Barriers 
Communication challenges exist between NATO service members and CORs in 
the joint OCONUS environment primarily due to language barriers. NATO service 
members and foreign nationals work together in theater and although there were some 
translators, communication remained challenging. One OCONUS Leader said that the 
language barrier among the Danish soldiers, as well as their misunderstanding or inability 
to follow regulations, constantly caused issues that prevented them from assisting in 
contract administration functions.  
The effects of communication issues within the Army network can be devastating 
from a contract administration perspective, especially if CORs are not provided efficient 
responses to contract and legal questions. Furthermore, if language barriers exist within 
the network, misunderstandings and accidents can occur that increase the likelihood of 
security breaches and safety incidents.  
C. STAFF LEVELS 
To perform proper contract oversight and surveillance, the Army needs sufficient 
contract administration resources. CONUS and OCONUS CORs are the primary 
resource; therefore, it is vital that senior leaders and commanders provide adequate 
personnel to perform contract oversight and surveillance. 
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Inadequate post-award staff levels of CORs and Quality Assurance Specialists in 
both CONUS and OCONUS environments were noted during the interviews and in 
multiple published reports. The GAO (2012) “discovered a significant factor that might 
contribute to a shortage of CORs is that contract oversight is often assigned a lower 
priority for units than tasks associated with their primary missions,” likely because 
“Commanders, particularly those in combat units, do not perceive contract management 
and oversight as a warfighter task and question the idea that units should be responsible 
for contract oversight” (p. 25). 
During the interviews, both CORs and Leaders and Commanders of CORs cited 
the problem of inadequate contract oversight staff levels. When asked if CORs were 
provided adequate time to perform duties, an OCONUS COR responded, “I didn’t have 
adequate time to do all the CORs duties, I ended up working 14–16 hour days, seven days 
a week. I was overwhelmed with my priorities. There should have been a COR in country 
for each of the contracts that I was managing.” Moreover, a military leader of an Army 
Contract Support Brigade that left Iraq in March 2016 mentioned that “there were a total 
of 52 service contracts being managed by the brigade; however, only 7 CORs were 
available to perform oversight,” which equates to each COR overseeing almost 8 
contracts. 
Inadequate post-award staff levels for contract oversight is prevalent in both 
CONUS and OCONUS environments. For example, a Leader of CORs also commented 
during the interview that the Army Contracting Command has a limited number of 
Quality Assurance (QA) Specialists. QA Specialists assist CORs in QASP development 
and overall contract surveillance. One CONUS COR with COR responsibilities that are 
deemed other duties as assigned mentioned that he spends approximately 70% of his 
time doing COR duties instead of his primary position duties because of inadequate time 
to perform all his duties. A Leader of CORs mentioned that “the majority of sub-par COR 
performance came from those CORs who performed COR duties as other duties as 
assigned because they were burdened with other job tasks and didn’t have proper time to 
devote to the COR duties.” These candid statements validate how significant the 
inadequacy of the contract oversight staff level is within the Army. 
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The effects of inadequate post-award staff levels are prevalent in both CONUS 
and OCONUS environments. Insufficient resources to support contract administration 
functions leads to sub-par goods and services being received, which may present safety 
and security risks to the Army. Many of the interviewees are hoping that Army leaders 
will see the value in increasing staff levels in support of contract administration functions 
so that proper surveillance can be conducted to protect Army interests. After all, the DOD 
procures the majority of its goods and services through contracted requirements. 
D. OVERSIGHT 
The processes and contract oversight functions performed by CORs are different in 
CONUS versus OCONUS environments. CONUS CORs serve as the primary COR, and 
they handle the bulk of the contract administration (e.g., submitting monthly COR reports; 
reviewing and approving contractor invoices; tracking Contract Data Requirement Lists 
(CDRLs); providing annual input to CPARS for contractor performance; and seeking 
resolutions to contracting issues from the Contracting Officer and relaying that information 
to the OCONUS COR). Contract oversight and surveillance (e.g., performing physical on-
site inspections of contractor performance and quality of product or service against the 
QASP; inventorying government furnished equipment; and conducting unannounced site-
visits to validate personnel levels, security, environmental, safety, and testing procedures) 
among CONUS CORs tends to not be performed nor supported by leadership as a priority.  
On the other hand, OCONUS CORs tend to focus on safety, contract surveillance, 
and quality assurance, relying on the primary CONUS COR to perform most administrative 
functions. The administrative duties that OCONUS CORs perform include maintaining the 
SPOT database, issuing Letters of Authorization (LOAs) to contractors, validating Theater 
Business Clearances (TBCs), and providing monthly personnel reporting to Central 
Command (CENTCOM) and higher headquarters. OCONUS CORs also ensure that 
contractors process through CONUS replacement centers as part of pre- and post-
deployment. 
Contract oversight is absolutely vital to the DOD and the Army, especially with 
the high degree of complexity related to the products and services being procured. 
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CONUS and OCONUS CORs provide contract oversight and surveillance to ensure that 
the Army is receiving the quality of product or service required by the contract. Figure 1 
depicts the three service groups (Knowledge-based; Research and Development; and 
Facility-related) where the DOD obligated over half of its FY14 contracted service 
dollars. Notably, during FY14, the DOD obligated more funds to services than it did to 
products such as aircraft, ships, vehicles, and missiles. Overseeing contracted services 
requires a tremendous amount of continual quality assurance and surveillance practices in 
order for the DOD to validate it received the level of service required by contract. 
 
Figure 1.  Comparison of DOD Obligations on Contracts for Selected 
Products and Top Three Portfolio Groups of Services in 
Fiscal Year 2014. Source: GAO (2016, p. 15). 
Contract surveillance is a fundamental duty for CORs and all of the interviews 
echoed its importance. We asked CORs whether they performed on-site surveillance as 
prescribed in the QASP, one CONUS COR commented that she did not perform on-site 
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surveillance as much as she needed to and that most often she relied on other government 
personnel located at the site of contract performance to assist her in conducting 
surveillance. Another CONUS COR said that he had not gone out to do surveillance as 
much as he needed to because of travel funding and authorization issues—leadership 
priorities do not support contract surveillance. Unfortunately, his response was reaffirmed 
by other interviewees. 
A DOD IG report (2015a) validated the lack of contract oversight among Army 
contracts, finding that a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers COR for a 2013 services contract 
“did not effectively monitor contractor performance, specifically the COR only made 
minimal visits to the project site even though it was visited by quality assurance officials on 
a regular basis” (p. 1). In addition, a 2015 defense audit found “gaps in Army oversight of 
the Ebola Fight contract [in which the contract] failed to [have an] acceptable Quality 
Assurance Surveillance Plan as required by federal regulations [and that] the Army 
appointed four CORs who had not undergone required training to oversee the contract” 
(Sege, 2015, p. 1). 
Leaders and Commanders of CORs cited a major issue with CORs performing 
contract oversight in both CONUS and OCONUS environments in which CORs did not 
always have the technical knowledge needed to oversee contracts. Some Army 
organizations have OCONUS CORs in theater who oversee technical specifications and 
report results back to the primary CONUS COR. During the interview, one Commander 
said, “some of the OCONUS CORs who were appointed to oversee and survey service 
contracts really didn’t have the technical knowledge to perform surveillance properly.” 
Many published reports validate this issue. In GAO report (2012), contracting officials 
noted “that guard towers at a forward operating base [in Afghanistan] were poorly 
constructed and unsafe to occupy [as] the staircase was unstable and not strong enough for 
climbing; [whereby], the COR’s inadequate subject area related technical expertise or 
access to subject matter experts prevented the early identification of the defective welding 
on the staircase” (p. 19). Unfortunately, officials also mentioned that similar situations 
occur frequently because of the shortage of CORs with appropriate construction 
knowledge.  
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It should be noted that the DOD COR handbook specifically mentions that CORs 
being nominated to oversee contracts shall have “technical expertise relating to the 
requirements within the contract, and that [managers] should consider individual skill set 
and [required technical] experience when identifying a COR” (DPAP, OUSD[AT&L], 
2012a, p. 17). Several factors have led to managers overlooking the requirements for CORs 
to have certain technical qualifications and required experience: (1) the culture within 
Army leadership has not fully embraced the importance of having technically skilled CORs 
survey contracts to ensure the USG gets full value; (2) Operational Contract Support (OCS) 
has not been properly institutionalized within the Army; and (3) the limited number of 
technically-qualified CORs forced managers to nominate personnel who do not have the 
appropriate experience and technical knowledge. 
The effects of inadequate COR oversight are alarming to DOD and Army officials. 
Additional funding and rework is necessary to fix defective deliverables so that Army can 
obtain a functional finished product. The Army becomes vulnerable from a health, safety 
and security perspective when proper oversight is not conducted, and the potential for 
fraud, waste, and abuse increases as well. Overall, in instances of inadequate contract 
oversight, the Army ends up not getting full value for the price paid. 
E. LEADERSHIP SUPPORT 
All the interviewees agreed that commanders and leaders need to better understand 
and support contract administration functions. In the GAO report (2011) the Secretary of 
Defense tried to change the culture and institutionalize OCS. He instructed joint 
commanders and senior leaders to identify resources to improve OCS in hopes of solving 
contract oversight issues. The report found that “commanders do not always understand 
their units’ role and responsibilities to provide contract management and oversight and 
even question why units should be responsible for contract oversight” (2011, p. 10). Our 
interview with a Leader of CORs attached to an Army Contract Support Brigade mirrored 
these results, with the Leader stating, “we constantly experienced combat units struggling 
to provide CORs to perform contract administration and surveillance duties in Iraq.” 
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We asked whether they had adequate support and time from their organization to 
perform COR duties, a CONUS COR responded “my leadership never asked about the 
status of the duties I was performing, nor did my supervisor understand what I was doing as 
a COR, so leadership did not support or help me.” Another CONUS COR said, “No, 
because leadership priorities do not support contract surveillance.” An OCONUS COR 
responded, “Yes,” primarily because of the Liaison Officer duties he was performing in 
addition to COR duties, but he further explained that his CONUS leader neither had a clue 
about his responsibilities as a COR nor his duties in theater. Several CORs made similar 
comments, contending that managers who have never been a COR do not understand the 
roles and responsibilities of CORs and therefore cannot relate. We asked Leaders and 
Commanders of CORs whether they had served as a COR—only one out of four had. So 
the majority of Leaders and Commanders of CORs have never been a COR, which 
validates the comments we heard from the CORs. 
Commanders and leaders certainly have influence over their personnel. 
Commanders and leaders expect CORs to perform duties outside of their normal chain of 
command at different locations and sometimes senior leaders pressure CORs into 
performing unauthorized and potentially unethical duties. A GAO report (2008) found that 
“contracting personnel, including CORs, are sometimes placed in positions where their 
direct supervisor is not in the contracting chain-of-command, thus possibly injecting risk 
into the integrity of the contracting process” (p. 10). In a follow-up interview question 
about controlling fraud, a Leader of CORs talked about how the lines of authority need to 
be better defined, especially if a commander or leader uses their position and ultimate 
authority to get a COR to do what they want (above and beyond the requirements in the 
contract). The interviews revealed that a lot of CORs suffer from command influence, 
where senior leaders tell CORs to get the job done. This form of influence and pressure 
affects both CONUS and OCONUS CORs. 
A final leadership area that has been problematic for contract administration 
involves a 2013 DOD Instruction 5010.40 entitled “Managers’ Internal Control Program 
Procedures.” This instruction requires DOD organizations to develop internal controls to 
verify that programs are functioning as intended. The DOD IG (2014) cited PEO STRI for 
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having “internal control weaknesses in contract administration and oversight” and further 
stated that “PEO STRI contracting personnel did not have controls [in place] to adequately 
monitor and assess the contractor’s performance” (p. 3). Monitoring and assessing 
contractor performance is a duty of contract oversight and surveillance which is performed 
by CORs. Although this finding involves inadequate oversight, DOD IG made a precedent 
in this case by finding the PEO STRI leadership ultimately responsible. During the 
interviews, the interviewees were evidently aware of this DOD Instruction, as they made 
comments about processes and procedures they used: procedures for controlling fraud; 
procedures for invoice review and contractor payment, etc. 
 Commanders and leaders can have both positive and negative effects on the 
contract administration process. Commanders and leaders who use their influence in a 
positive way by reinforcing high ethical standards can help to reduce fraud and make the 
contract administration process run more efficiently. However, when commanders and 
leaders do not communicate to CORs and provide the necessary support, they can 
ultimately weaken the integrity of contract oversight and surveillance practices. 
F. SUMMARY 
Our analysis found five common COR issues that must be addressed. First, 
education/training should focus on appropriate training of CORs for OCONUS operations 
and ensuring all CORs understand how to write and use a QASP. Second, Contracting 
Officers and CORs need to properly communicate; and transition time between incoming 
and outgoing CORs needs to be lengthened. Third, adequate staff levels need to be 
established and maintained for CORs and Quality Assurance Specialists. Fourth, adequate 
contract oversight practices need to be identified and supported by leadership; and 
leadership needs to thoughtfully nominate CORs, validating that they possess the required 
technical expertise. Finally, leadership needs to communicate and provide adequate support 
to CORs to ensure positive outcomes during the contract administration process. Each of 
these trends are areas for improvement. The implications of these findings will be 
discussed in Chapter V. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This Joint Applied Project analyzed Army contract administration procedures in 
CONUS and OCONUS environments performed by CORs overseeing service contracts. 
The project explored COR roles, responsibilities, education/training, communication, 
contract administration staff levels, oversight, and leadership support. The initial chapters 
explored Army contract administration procedures relating to the COR functions by 
exploring federal, DOD, and Army regulations, policies, guides, and training. We 
analyzed published COR-related reports and we identified COR trends. Later chapters 
validated those trends by using interviews to identify five common areas of contract 
administration issues: education/training, communication, staff levels, oversight, and 
leadership support. 
An overarching conclusion to this research is that Army contract administration 
practices are different in CONUS and OCONUS environments. The COR’s roles, 
responsibilities, training, and communication practices are different depending on 
whether the COR is functioning in a CONUS or OCONUS environment. Additionally, 
contract administration staff levels, oversight, and leadership involvement are different 
depending on the COR’s environment. This chapter summarizes answers to the research 
questions posed in Chapter I. We provide specific and attainable recommendations to 
improve Army contract administration procedures in CONUS and OCONUS 
environments. Finally, we identify potential areas for further research. 
A. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Are COR Processes and Training Different or the Same in CONUS 
and OCONUS Environments? 
We found that COR training is different in CONUS and OCONUS environments. 
Education and training requirements are different primarily because OCONUS CORs are 
required to take additional training. Better contract quality assurance outcomes require 
CORs to be fully knowledgeable in their functional area and be good communicators. 
Currently, to ensure that OCONUS CORs get sufficient operational knowledge of 
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contracting, Army Contracting Command-Kuwait provides theater-specific COR training 
which augments the mandatory COR training. 
The processes and contract oversight functions performed by CORs are also 
different in CONUS and OCONUS environments. CONUS CORs perform the 
administrative functions of being a COR quite well, while OCONUS CORs tend to focus 
on safety, technical oversight, contract surveillance, and quality assurance. Improvement 
of the functions not being routinely performed by CONUS and OCONUS CORs is 
recommended. CONUS CORs should be performing technical oversight and contract 
surveillance in addition to the administrative functions they already perform. The current 
model being used for contracts that require COR oversight in CONUS and OCONUS 
environments should become the standard where OCONUS CORs and CONUS CORs 
perform specific contract administration duties. Leadership support in increasing COR 
staff levels will help fulfill this recommendation. 
2. What Are the Lessons Learned/Best Practices in Overseeing Army 
CONUS and OCONUS Service Contracts? 
First, inadequate COR training may be detrimental to the Army’s mission, as 
CORs provide oversight to important CONUS and OCONUS service contracts (i.e., troop 
support contracts). Second, communication problems exist between CONUS contracting 
staff and OCONUS CORs, which requires improvement so that OCONUS CORs have 
accurate and timely advice to perform their duties. 
Third, staff levels to support the contract administration function of CORs 
providing contract oversight in CONUS and OCONUS environments are inadequate. 
Although there is no specific guidance published that outlines the number of contracts a 
COR can be responsible for, the COR handbook advises that the requiring organization 
must allow adequate resources for the COR to perform duties. Adequate resources 
include people, time, equipment, training, funding, and opportunity. Without the proper 
staff levels to perform contract administration, it will be difficult for the government to 
determine whether the contractor was properly executing the contract requirements. 
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Fourth, managers are nominating CORs who do not possess the required technical 
knowledge and experience to perform proper contract surveillance and oversight. The 
success or failure of a contract can be dependent on having technically skilled and 
knowledgeable CORs ensuring that contractors are performing to the terms and 
conditions of the contract. Finally, the fifth lesson learned involves commanders and 
leaders not understanding the requirements needed to support the contract administration 
phase, not understanding COR roles and responsibilities, and not wanting to commit 
resources to support contract administration. Support for contracting must come from top 
leaders who understand the contracting phases and functions and can relay that support 
down to lower levels. 
3. What Are the Relative Advantages and Disadvantages of CORs 
Performing Administration on Army Contracts in CONUS and 
OCONUS?  
Several relative advantages of CORs performing administration on Army 
contracts in both CONUS and OCONUS environments exist. CORs add value to the 
contract administration process because they perform contract oversight to ensure the 
contractor is performing effectively based on the terms and conditions of the contract. In 
performing contract surveillance, CORs provide valuable feedback to the Contracting 
Officer so that contract cost, schedule, and performance can be managed to ensure 
positive outcomes. 
The primary disadvantages of CORs performing administration on Army 
contracts in both CONUS and OCONUS environments comes from inadequate resources 
(people, time, equipment, training, funding, and opportunity) to perform contract 
surveillance, an insufficient number of CORs performing oversight, and CORs lacking 
technical experience. Other disadvantages include a lack of operational chain-of-
command support for CORs to perform contract surveillance and commanders/senior 
leaders failing to understand COR roles and responsibilities. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The COR is the technical representative who must communicate with the 
contracting officer and contract personnel to ensure satisfactory performance and timely 
delivery of goods and services as set forth in contracts. The COR’s role has never been as 
challenging as it is today, highlighting the need for the most up-to-date and realistic 
training prior to appointment. The acquisition environment in which CORs function is 
complex—being trained, technically skilled, and resourced appropriately leads to positive 
contract outcomes. Further, proper management and support for CORs is critical—it can 
make the difference between contract success and failure. As a result of our research, we 
recommend several improvements to contract administration procedures in CONUS and 
OCONUS environments.  
First, we recommend all CORs read and use the following materials: 
 
 The COR Dos and Don’ts—Contract Administration and 
Remedies Checklist: (DPAP, OUSD[AT&L], 2012a, p. 184). The 
checklist is provided at Appendix G. 
 DOD Best Practice Checklist for COR Surveillance Checklist: 
(DPAP, OUSD[AT&L], 2012b, p. 195). The checklist is provided 
at Appendix H. 
 DOD Contracting Officer Representative Tracking (CORT) 
application. CORs can access this application through Wide Area 
Work Flow (WAWF) at https://wawf.eb.mil. 
Second, we recommend the following changes identified in the five common 
areas of concern: 
(1) Education/Training 
COR training needs to be standardized. Currently, if you ask an OCONUS 
representative the COR training requirements, you will get an answer that differs from a 
CONUS representative. Senior leaders from all services need to understand post-award 
contracting requirements as part of their pre-deployment preparation training. This 
training is available through the Army Logistics University at Ft. Belvoir, VA. The 
course is informally known as the “3C” course; however, its proper name is the 
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Operational Contract Support (OCS) course. Leaders need to know about contract 
administration and COR roles and responsibilities. OCS should be mandatory training for 
all service leaders, especially with the amount of contracting occurring in theater.  
Further, the DOD should update COR training material by expanding upon the 
following areas: QASP development and usage; Contingency COR course; Financial 
Management for CORs; and SPOT adjudicating and security measures. The current DAU 
Ethics training needs to be updated to include a scenario that educates OCONUS CORs 
about cultural heritage and customary practices in Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly as it 
relates to accepting gifts. Army Contracting needs to educate and train senior leadership 
about the support and commitment required during the post-award contracting phase in 
both CONUS and OCONUS environments. 
(2) Communication 
The COR should constantly communicate and interact with the contractor to 
troubleshoot and resolve issues to keep contracts on schedule with good performance. 
The Army should establish an Army COR Transition Plan for all CORs. The outgoing 
and incoming COR should have at least 2–4 weeks of overlap so that the incoming COR 
can be briefed on the contract status, problem areas, and meet the contractor staff for each 
contract. For better transition among OCONUS CORs, incoming CORs should be 
assigned a sponsor, provided a pre-deployment checklist, provided a required training 
list, and the outgoing COR should be communicating and providing the PWSs and 
QASPs for transitioning contracts to allow for proper transition of contract administration 
functions and for better overall understanding of the contracts under the COR’s purview. 
(3) Staff Levels 
The Army should increase the number of CORs and Quality Assurance 
Specialists in both CONUS and OCONUS environments to allow for proper contract 
oversight and surveillance. Quality Assurance Specialists assist CORs in QASP 
development and overall contract surveillance practices. We recommend that a COR be 
assigned to no more than four contract efforts at any given time. This 1:4 ratio will 
provide CORs the time needed to thoroughly understand each contract they oversee, and 
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to be able to keep up with the demanding inspection requirements. This ratio will also 
allow CORs to perform their duties under realistic expectations, which could create more 
positive outcomes. 
(4) Oversight 
For contracts that require COR oversight in CONUS and OCONUS 
environments, two CORs should be appointed on the contract: one to perform OCONUS 
technical oversight, surveillance, and Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) tracking 
in theater, and another to perform CONUS oversight and administrative tasks. Quality 
Assurance Specialists should be embedded throughout all Army contracting offices to 
assist CORs in QASP development and contract surveillance. 
(5) Leadership Support 
First, commanders, leaders, and supervisors need to better understand and support 
COR-related contract administration functions. Second, commanders and leaders should 
provide proper funding on the contracts so that CORs can travel to perform proper 
contract oversight and surveillance. Third, the DAU or the Army should establish a 24x7 
COR hotline where CORs can get immediate answers to contracting or legal questions. 
Fourth, more emphasis needs to be placed on COR duties and accountability, especially 
since COR duties are assigned as secondary duties to civilian and military members. 
Fifth, the contract administration support CORs provide needs to be a part of both 
military and civilian annual performance ratings. 
(6) Summary 
These recommendations are specific and can be accomplished in a time-phased 
approach, but they do require Army Headquarters level support.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Through the process of performing this research, we found three potential areas 
for further research. First, future researchers should explore the processes used by the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition Logistics and Technology (ASA ALT) in 
Afghanistan on becoming a COR in theater, as there is a dedicated group of trainees who 
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require different training and theater-specific qualifications than provided in the DOD 
Standard training for CORs. 
Second, future researchers should examine the current status of controlling fraud 
in contingency operations. DOD has placed great emphasis on this area through 
continued education and vigilance—it would be useful to compare our current fraud 
status (e.g., number of cases, severity of cases, etc.) to our past fraud status. Army 
Contracting Command has taken the approach of constantly communicating and 
interacting with CORs, reminding them they should operate by the highest ethical 
standards, and to avoid doing something that feels improper. 
Third, future researchers should perform an analysis of why some Army 
organizations appoint CORs as a full-time position while others appoint CORs as part-
time, or “other duties as assigned.” The analysis can determine whether the full-time 
CORs performed better (e.g., better performance monitoring, more successful contract 
outcomes, better control of fraud and waste, etc.) than their part-time counterparts, 
providing rationale for keeping the status quo or moving toward more full-time positions. 
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APPENDIX A. COR RESPONSIBILITIES 














































































































































APPENDIX B. DESCRIPTIONS OF REQUIRED 
COR TRAINING.  
COR with a Mission Focus (DAU CLC 106) provides the student with general 
knowledge of being a COR by explaining the duties CORs perform in the DOD 
acquisition environment; Contracting Officer’s Representative (DAU CLC 222) 
training provides students the knowledge relating to COR roles and responsibilities in 
performing the technical surveillance of contractor performance; Ethics for AT&L 
Workforce (DAU CLM-003) provides students with knowledge of legal ethical 
standards concerning communications between government personnel and contractors; 
Combatting Trafficking in Persons (CTIP) Awareness training covers the frank and 
candid realities of trafficking in persons (TIP) around the world; Invoicing, Receipt, 
Acceptance, and Property Transfer (IRAPT) training provides knowledge about the 
wed-based system used by contractors and CORs for electronic invoicing, receipt and 
acceptance; and DOD CORT Tool training provides knowledge on the web-based 
system for the appointment of CORs allowing “prospective CORs, COR Supervisors and 
Contracting Officers to electronically process the nomination and appointment of CORs 
for one or multiple contracts” (DPAP, OUSD[AT&L], 2012b, p. 31). Optional training 
descriptions are provided: Contingency Environment (DAU CLC 206) provides 
knowledge of “the basics of contracting, along with the ethical situations and cultural 
differences a COR may experience while deployed in a contingency environment” 
(Nguyen, 2011, p. 32); and Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker 
(SPOT) is a joint web application designed for the management of contract efforts and 
personnel who accompany U.S. forces in theater. SPOT training provides CORs with the 
knowledge to “verify [contracted personnel’s] identity for use of DOD’s facilities, track 
contractor personnel movements, and determine eligibility of DOD support services” 
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APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL ARMY COR TRAINING 
Operations Security (OPSEC) provides information about protecting 
unclassified information relating to operations and personal information to ensure safe 
and successful military missions. CORs need to possess operational security knowledge 
in order to protect contract information so that military operations are not compromised. 
Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) training provides 
CORs with knowledge to create, review, and submit annual contractor performance 
assessments and evaluations per FAR 42. The CPARS system is the mandatory web 
based application where CORs enter annual contractor performance information. 
Contractor Manpower Reporting Application (CMRA) training provides CORs with 
the knowledge to review and confirm contractor information within the CMRA web 
based application. CORs are required to annually validate that the contractor has 
completed information such as funding, contract, labor hours, costs, organization 
supported, and function performed which are known as National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA) elements. Electronic Document Access (EDA) knowledge allows CORs to 
access this web-based application 24/7 by providing “view-only” access and retrieval of 
contracts and vendor payment information, as well as, creating Contract Deficiency 
Reports. Local Vendor Base training provides CORs with knowledge of vendor capacity 
and skill sets for a given region. This training is provided in theater and is beneficial to 
CORs in order to know region specific vendor capabilities especially for unique 
procurements. Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape (SERE) training provides 
OCONUS CORs with the knowledge and tactics to survive, evade, resist, and escape if 
taken captive while serving in a contingency environment. Country specific pre-
deployment training provides OCONUS CORs with up-to-date information such as on-
going threats, customs, culture, and acceptable practices for the country they will be 
serving in. Language/dialect training provides COR with the skill to understand and 
communicate based on the country they will be serving in. CORs must be able to verbally 
communicate with local vendors in a given country. Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA) knowledge is vital to an OCONUS COR because status protections must be in 
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place with a host nation to define, account for, and protect procedural rights of U.S. DOD 
personnel supporting mission requirements. The DOD (2011) requires “planners, 
requiring activities, [and] contracting officers [to] review applicable SOFAs and related 
agreements to determine their effect on the status and use of contractors in support of 
applicable contingency operations” (p.11). Theater Business Clearance (TBC) 
knowledge is essential for OCONUS CORs as they need to be able to verify contract 
personnel arriving in theater against actual contract personnel authorizations for services 
being performed. Additionally, CORs need to review the contract to ensure that 




APPENDIX D. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS—CORs.  
1. What role and responsibilities do you perform being a COR? 
2. How were you officially appointed to be a COR? 
3. As a COR, how did you help facilitate the surveillance of Army service 
and developmental contracts in CONUS or OCONUS? 
4. Are you aware of COR processes being different or the same in CONUS 
or OCONUS environments? 
5. Did you receive adequate COR training to perform COR duties either in a 
CONUS or OCONUS environment? 
6. If you have served as an OCONUS COR, did you receive COR OCONUS 
specific training prior to deployment? 
7. What contract administration and surveillance duties for CONUS or 
OCONUS efforts did perform? 
8. Were you provided adequate time to perform your COR duties? 
9. Do you approve invoices as a COR for CONUS or OCONUS actions? If 
so, do you find the automated COR invoicing system adequate? 
10. Did you submit timely COR monthly reports to the Contracting Officer? If 
so, did you note any issues and were those issues acted upon by 
leadership? Did you submit monthly reports into an on-line database or 
did you email reports to the Contracting Officer? 
11. Have you ever developed a Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP)? 
If so, what were the key elements of that document? 
12. For delivery or task order contracts that you provide contract 
administration on, do you use a standard or specific QASP for each task/
deliver order? 
13. Did you perform on-site surveillance as prescribed in the QASP? 
14. Did your organization allow you to travel to perform on-site contract 
surveillance? 
15. As a COR, have you been involved in any contract disputes or cases of 
fraud? If so, explain. 
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16. Were the COR duties you were appointed to perform viewed within your 
organization as “other duties as assigned” or were your COR duties listed 
in your annual performance objectives? 
17. Did Contracting Officers provide timely and accurate responses to any 
COR related questions you might have had? 
18. Did you receive adequate support and time from your organization to 
perform COR duties? 
19. Do you receive system reminders or is it the COR’s responsibility to keep 
training certifications up to date? 
20. What COR reference document or policy do you refer to quite often for 
COR guidance? 
21. Were you provided a conformed (fully signed) copy of your official COR 
appointment letter? 
22. Were you provided a copy of the contract you provided COR support to? 
23. As a COR, how many simultaneously actives contracts (task orders) were 
you responsible for in performing contract administration duties? 




APPENDIX E. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS—LEADERS OF CORs.  
1. What are the lessons learned in overseeing Army service and 
developmental contracts in CONUS or OCONUS? 
2. What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of CORs performing 
administration on Army contracts in CONUS or OCONUS? 
3. Are you familiar with the roles and responsibilities of CORs in a CONUS 
or OCONUS environment? 
4. Are you familiar with the required COR training differences in a CONUS 
or OCONUS environment? 
5. Have you ever officially served as a COR? If so, was it in a CONUS or 
OCONUS environment? 
6. Was it mandatory for you to be COR trained prior to overseeing CORs in 
CONUS or OCONUS? 
7. In providing oversight and leadership to the CORs performing contract 
administration duties within your organization, was there any fraud 
committed? If so, please explain further. 
8. How does your organization control fraud with regards to CORs 
performing contract administration and surveillance? 
9. Have you ever approved CONUS or OCONUS contractor invoices for 
payment? If so, how did you confirm that the goods or services were 
received? 
10. Do you review and approved Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans 
(QASPs) within your organization? 
11. What key aspects of the QASP do you look for to ensure sound 
surveillance practices are conducted? 
12. Within your organization, are COR duties viewed as “other duties as 
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APPENDIX F. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS—COMMANDERS OF 
CORs.  
1. What are the lessons learned in overseeing Army service and 
developmental contracts in CONUS and OCONUS? 
2. What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of CORs performing 
administration on Army contracts in CONUS or OCONUS? 
3. Are you familiar with the roles and responsibilities of CORs in a CONUS 
or OCONUS environment? 
4. Have you ever officially served as a COR? If so, was it in a CONUS or 
OCONUS environment? 
5. Was it mandatory for you to be COR trained prior to overseeing Army 
service and developmental contracts in CONUS or OCONUS? 
6. Was there any fraud committed with regards to CORs performing contract 
administration duties under your command? If so, please explain further. 
7. How did your unit control fraud with regards to CORs performing contract 
administration and surveillance? 
8. What do you foresee being the most concerning challenge of CORs 
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APPENDIX G. CHECKLIST FOR CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION 
AND REMEDIES 
Table 5.   DOS and DON’Ts of Contract Administration and Remedies. 
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APPENDIX H. CHECKLIST FOR COR SURVEILLANCE 
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